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Summary
The author points out empirical indicators to distinguish “consultants” from 
analysts as “independent policy actors”. The complexity of decision-making 
processes in modern states created demand for independent expert support. 
This demand has been satisfied by new institutes of intellectual political sup-
port – think tanks. Support, an estimation of political decisions and alterna-
tives, generating of ideas, education and elite formation became their func-
tions. According to the functional approach, due to the complexity and scale 
of modern administrative problems, the expert became an integral part of the 
decision-making process. In differentiated social systems, in order to increase 
the efficiency of decisions and to maintain the social “feedback” mechanism, 
policy-makers involve experts, including think tanks, to work out new and to 
estimate old political decisions. In these processes think tanks are engaged, 
conducting researches and consultations for the decision-makers. So in mo-
dern states the mechanism of “feedback” is carried out. In practice, we can 
see some analysts and experts who pretend to play a dominant role in policy; 
some who legitimize policy of the government, decisions of a political leader 
or a current political regime; some who conduct professional research and de-
velopment of the “feedback mechanism” within a policy cycle; and some who 
have real power on minds of the elites and/or citizens. The author aims to fi-
gure out the factors that influence the changing political status of the analysts, 
what makes them independent political actors, and in what conditions they 
come to serve the elites’ interest. And, most importantly, how we can fix or 
stabilize the analysts’ status as independent and powerful political actors even 
in an unfavorable political climate.
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Tracing the development of different traditions in assessing the role of analysts, 
researchers or any other type of intellectuals vis-à-vis power structures in defining 
and shaping up the policy process – from the ideas of ancient Greeks on “govern-
ment by philosophers” and the neo-Marxist vision of a “power-legitimizing role”, 
to the modernist “functional role” of ethics-free technocrats and the more contem-
porary approach, currently building up recognition, with the analysts’ potential role 
of “autonomous policy-shaping actors” – we want to devote this article to the latest 
tradition, but with particular focus on social conditions and the institutional frame-
work in which such an “independent role” is possible.
In order to present those conditions, we need to understand – and in some cases 
re-define – the changing institutional environments for analytical work in the poli-
cy-making process. 
Understanding Governance in Three Traditions 
Conceptualization of the notion “public policy” began in the United States at the 
end of the 1960s, and was driven by the need to re-design public service, to make 
it more effective, more dynamic, more responsive to societal needs. Since then, 
though experiencing many amendments and variations, there has been a recogni-
zable model of defining the public policy notion which connects it closely to the ac-
tions of governing bodies.
Public policy is “what Governments do or do not do” – that is the most famous 
definition. So it allows to define a particular “American tradition” in public policy 
and governance studies that is very close to “public administration”, and defining 
“public policy” is viewed – in many cases – as just the “first step” of “public admi-
nistration”, creating a “program” that would need to be implemented.
“European” tradition developed later, using the “American” tradition, but it 
was much more focused on the “variety of actors”, among which the Government 
itself is not necessarily the main one. European tradition is more focused on non-
-state actors, as well as on defining their different and often conflicting interests, 
mechanisms of regulations, procedures of agreement and reconciliation, including 
the monitoring of decisions based on compromises.
A new understanding of public policy as a system of “co-management” (go-
vernance) is developing in the practice of international supranational European in-
stitutions, the Council of Europe and the European Union (Holzhacker and Albaek, 
2007).
No wonder that the concepts of “public policy” and of “governance” present 
the most relief in studies of the European Union devoted to the analysis of decision-
-making and institutions, since, unlike the nation-state, there is no essentially “chief 
executive institution”, and states in the EU are completely equal. Thus, all members 
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of this alliance are equally involved in “co-management”, which is managing the 
mutual influence on each other. Of course, this system of co-management demand-
ed the creation of an additional set of structures and systems of coordination of in-
terests, both between countries and governments. With the involvement of other 
actors external to the EU – representatives of national and international business 
networks, public and municipal associations, etc., in decision-making on each task: 
movement of labor resources, common education and migration policies, the har-
monization of price policies for different sectors of the economy, etc. – it creates an 
appropriate structure. The result was a layered system of coordination of interests 
named “the committee system”.
The authors of the “Russian Business Lobbying in the U.S. and the EU: Evolu-
tion and Prospects” report (Peregudov, Utkin and Kostyaev, 2009: 14-15; see also 
Wallace and Young, 1997: 20; Shokhin and Korolev, 2008) indicate that, at various 
levels of EU public policy, there were approximately 1400 different committees and 
working groups at the end of 1990, in addition to the basic political institutions of 
the EU; this number rose to 1800 by 2005, and these institutions employ 80 thou-
sand people. The authors emphasize that “the very nature of the formulation and 
decision-making in the EU turns out to be largely mediated by non-direct partici-
pation of EU interest groups and pressure groups of various nature and purpose in 
the institutional structure. Those groups include business organizations, and large 
corporations, and civil society organizations, regional and ethnic formations of the 
Union countries, many cultural, scientific and other entities” (ibid.).
However, this European approach does not put an end to the formation of the 
concept of public policy. At the present stage, the increasing popularity of and in-
terest for the development of public policy have moved it to the global level, where 
co-management and mutual influences include not only the countries of one region 
– Europe – but countries around the whole world. Most current works about pub-
lic policy and governance today are devoted to global relations. Among them we 
should note the compilation of works by Patricia Kennett, in which, based on the 
vast material related to the analysis of practical examples of mechanisms “of global 
coordination”, the author explores the strategy and tactics of global co-management 
actors, which lead to approval of new norms and rules of engagement in a rapidly 
globalizing world, and to the formation of new institutions of harmonization of dif-
ferent interests, whether in the sphere of international trade, the global labor mar-
ket, the environment or protection of the rights and interests of citizens united in the 
global social network (Kennett, 2008).
There are several approaches to conceptualization of the concept of governance, 
defined as “a minimum of government interference, as corporate management, as 
the new public management, as ‘good governance’, or a socio-cybernetic system, a 
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self-organizing network” (Rhodes, 2008: 51-74). However, the diversity of these ap-
proaches is insufficient to explain the ongoing changes in modern politics, like the 
process of globalization, the growing influence of international and supranational 
institutions, the emergence of new political spaces beyond national borders, the “dif-
fusion of political power” – from government to non-state political actors, as well 
as the “delegitimization of the nation-state”, the crisis of “welfare state”, and the old 
management paradigm based on hierarchical control of the state, sending signals 
from the “top” to the “down” (Koenig-Archibugi and Zürn, 2006: 178).
The new understanding of governance must encompass the idea of joint mana-
gement, changing the management paradigm and offering a new style of manage-
ment which means the inclusion of an increasing number of political actors in the 
process of formulation and implementation of public policy. The process of blurring 
the boundaries between public and private sectors has started. This demands new 
mechanisms of governance, based on other resources than the government’s autho-
rity and sanctions (Kennett, 2008: 4). Political administration in the style of this 
new understanding of governance (“joint” or “mutual” control) suggests a new role 
for government and state, acting as moderators in the political and administrative 
process to harmonize and promote the interests of different social groups and politi-
cal actors competing with each other.
Moreover, “mutual” administration is based on the inclusion of non-state po-
litical actors and institutions not only in the process of broad and public discussion 
prior to decisions, but also in the process of direct “doing policy” (business of po-
licy). Non-state actors are included in these processes – at the stage of elaboration 
and adoption of policies, and also at the stage of implementation of public-policy 
decisions – through a variety of institutions, methods and techniques (outsourcing, 
delegation, transfer of state functions).
What is it that unites the three existing traditions of public policy (American, 
European and global), except the fact that they have been consistently evolving, 
maintaining the continuity of the “core” concept comprehending, and are based on 
the new social reality?
The main thing they have in common is the preservation of the concept of pub-
lic space as the arena which hosts reconciliation of interests, and the public – as a 
set of independent, competent and concerned citizens who are able to participate in 
formulating and implementing policy decisions. It is important to note that in the 
development from American and European traditions to the global tradition, re-
quirements for “quality” of the public will only increase.
The second thing they have in common is regarding reconciliation of interests 
as a policy goal, with its governance understood as collective solutions to common 
problems.
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The third common trait that unites these traditions is an open public space for 
the stakeholders and the rate for approval as a principle of decision-making instead 
of pressure.
What distinguishes these traditions, and why do we consider them as indepen-
dent?
The most significant trait to distinguish them is the attitude to the main actor 
in the public sphere or, in other words, to the “strategic management subject”. In 
the first case (the “American” tradition), such a subject is a public authority – the 
state. In the second case (the “European” tradition), there is no main actor, and all 
subjects of public policy are deemed to be equal participants in decision-making. In 
case of the “global” tradition, the focus generally moves away from the actors to the 
procedures, mechanisms and ways of coordinating interests.
Nevertheless, if jointly agreed decisions are adopted and other different actors 
accept them, it shows that in some way – through particular coordinating activities – 
the process of such decision-making had been organized. It is also obvious that this 
kind of task cannot be handled by “average” or “ordinary” actors. It is clear that, 
acting in the space of highly contradictory interests, such a type of coordination can 
only be exercised by those who can suggest a strategy of collective action. Hence, 
our next step is the analysis of these “strategic actors”.
Understanding the Classification of Actors
“Strategic Actors” or Full-Fledged “Participants in the Public Policy Process”?
Attention to “actors” of public policy was the “starting position” for the establish-
ment of research approaches of the team of the Department of Public Policy, estab-
lished in the National Research University “Higher School of Economics” in the 
early 2000s, in order to develop the concept of “public policy”. Indeed, if research 
institutes in Russia are admittedly weak and perform poorly, who determines politi-
cal development? Who are these actors, how do they arise, how are they managed, 
how do they acquire resources and influence?
Finding answers to these questions has led to a series of studies, and then to 
the development of university courses devoted to specific kinds of “actors”, name-
ly “collective actors” having a common social nature, common symptoms that are 
similar types of use of political resources and similar strategies aimed at achieving 
political influence.
The main actors reputedly include government authorities at different levels 
of government, political parties, federal and regional press, big business, regional 
elites, civil society organizations and movements, and the local communities. Ob-
viously, the actors are very different not only between species, but also within each 
species – and not just in terms of “political weight”, but also with regard to another 
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criterion, which, in our opinion, is not less important: the degree of independence 
of their conduct in the political field. This criterion is central to political analysis, 
being converted to the actor’s own, “inner” qualities, allowing or not allowing the 
building of the actor’s own strategy for political behavior.
Categories of Actors
Further analysis led us to “structure” all actors in the field of public policy into three 
main categories – depending on their degree of “political independence”.
The first category – the lowest level of political independence – consists of 
political “agents” who do not have and do not implement their own strategy of po-
litical action, who act in politics in “another’s interests” and “at the expense of an-
other resource”, who, in fact, carry the political will of someone else (usually called 
“political booking”).
In the second category, “political actors” may actually have their “own” agenda 
in the current policy (they have a collective consciousness and will, capable of goal-
-setting), but they have very little of their own resources to exert significant influ-
ence on the behavior of other actors in the political field.
The third category of actors – most resourced – we termed “independent ac-
tors” of public policy, because such entities (their representation in Russian political 
field is limited) are not only able to formulate their own strategies for their own be-
havior, but are also able to offer (to impose) such strategies to other political actors. 
They have enough resources to decisively influence the behavior of other political 
actors (as dependent agents and independent, but weak actors).
Moreover, in accordance with our research, “full-fledged actors” of modern 
public policy in Russia are not only a “collective Kremlin”, or, in person, the Presi-
dent or Prime Minister, but also a number of public entities. For example, the “Me-
morial” organization or the Soldiers’ Mothers Committee, not only offering state 
and society on its agenda in the area of public policy, but also forcing authorities to 
take their agenda into account.
Very similar approaches on the various “roles” of actors in public policy de-
veloped within the framework of institutional theory. Here the question arises: how 
new institutions are created, from what, and by whom, depending on their forma-
tion. Accordingly, N. Fligstin, a representative of the institutional theoretical school, 
said that actors do not simply follow generally accepted meanings in their field, 
but “have a certain amount of social skills allowing to reproduce or challenge the 
system of power and privilege” (Fligstin, 2001: 45), i.e. to transform institutions. 
While agreeing with Fligstin’s basic idea about the role of “strategic actors” in the 
creation of institutions, we want to add that, in this case, there is a mutual enrich-
ment of two related disciplines – sociology and political science.
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The cognitive and analytical capabilities of a combination of the subject-ori-
ented approach with the “new institutionalism” in its various versions, which we 
tried to make use of, are very productive and allow us to use a broader range of tools 
for analyzing the Russian political system, the specifics of its individual elements, 
the actors and subjects (see e.g. Belyaeva, 2006: 7-26, 2007, 2010, 2011).
However, given the apparent similarity between the “independent subject of 
public policy”, proposed by our team, and the concept of “strategic actor”, proposed 
by Fligstin, it seems to us that these are close concepts which should still be “di-
lute”: “strategic actor” is the notion of a more general than “independent subject of 
public policy”, but the latter is a mandatory part of the first.
The “subjectivity” of our approach lies in the fact that the “focus” of analysis 
is placed precisely on those members of modern politics which have a real impact 
on the political development of the country, and in this case are governed by their 
own goals and follow their own strategies. At the same time, the institutional com-
ponent of this approach lies in the idea that in the aggregate political subjects can 
form new – but quite stable – institutions; for example, “the institution of regional 
lobbying” or “the institution of corporate representation”. The connection with the 
subject approach enables a comprehensive institutional review of the form of influ-
ence that this political entity has on the political process and the changing social 
and political institutions.
Our understanding of the public, i.e. of society composed of knowledgeable, 
competent citizens who are able to organize themselves in pursuit of common in-
terests, is based on “classical” interpretations thereof, dating back to the meaning 
of the term respublica. Namely, in accordance with those meanings, the public is 
the foundation of civil society, and its activity in concert with other political ac-
tors leads to the implementation of the “public interest” and to achieving “common 
good”, to a change, if necessary, of the existing political institutions.
The ability to cooperate, to assist “others”, based on solidarity and mutual trust 
– that is a property of representatives of the public or subjects of civil participation. 
Since the public is composed of citizens who have certain qualities – competence, 
awareness, autonomy (of which more will be said below), the inclusion of them in 
an active political practice, and on a regular basis, establishes the practice as an in-
stitution of civic participation. Thus, only the active members of the public support 
public institutions or transform them by their actions, or else destroy the old and 
create new institutions.
Understanding Analysts and the Intellectual Class
In our study, by referring to “analysts”, we intended to cover quite a wide range of 
people, namely “professionals of mental labor”: the representatives of university and 
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academic communities, members of think tanks in the administrations on all levels 
of regional government and independent research centers, regardless of how they are 
funded. As it turned out during our research, this category also includes employees of 
analytical services and media services, public opinion polls, the staff of departments 
of social assessment in the medium and large businesses, as well as staff and outside 
experts from business organizations in strategic planning and philanthropy, as they 
also help their “bosses” make management decisions most directly affecting the state 
of society. Moreover, in the category of “workers’ intellectual services” we included: 
employees of informational and analytical services of all kinds of regional funds and 
a variety of voluntary associations, and representatives of foreign and international 
research organizations and projects! Everyone who is directly mentioned and who is 
referred to indirectly – all who are engaged in laborious work to collect data about 
society conditions (for a variety of indicators), who try to analyze and interpret these 
data and search for answers to solve complex social and managerial problems – we 
refer to the category of “regional intellectuals”, irreplaceable soldiers of the research 
front, who, through public presentation of the collected data and analysis, try to in-
fluence the decision-making in the field of public administration.
Thus – through public presentation of their intellectual products – intellectu-
als are trying to influence the government, to become part of the chain of decision-
-making, and the strongest and most independent of them are striving to become full-
-fledged actors forming the agenda, the subjects of public policy in the region.
Understanding the Challenges of Analyst/Power Interactions
In shaping the design of analyst/power relations, the main question is: how are 
“people in power”, or “people who make decisions” compatible with “intellectu-
als”? The search for the answer is based on several assumptions. First: an intel-
lectual does not need power. Indeed, the phenomenon of power traditionally has 
been associated with coercion or threat of coercion: the power of the government, 
the power of the church, the power of the father – it is not by chance that we often 
use the term “power” when we speak about “force majeure”, which compels us to 
act against our will and apart from the dictates of reason – the power of nature, the 
power of circumstances.
As a social regulator, “power” appears where there is an opportunity to show 
force in order to control the other, where social categories are realized such as “de-
pendency”, “subordination” or simply “fear of punishment”.
In this sense, “intellect” – as a way of controlling the behavior of others 
through an appeal to reason, to rationality – not only does not use coercion, but it 
does not even appeal to it as a possible threat (“... if you are not going to listen to 
father, church, government, you will face negative consequences...”). Using intel-
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lect and “concentrated knowledge” in management is based on the justification of 
the position of manager (from the English word “reasoning” we derived the word 
“резонный” – reasonable), that is, a system of logical arguments addressed to rea-
son encourages reflection and analysis of these arguments with the result of adopt-
ing an independent decision on a preferred follow-up action based on one’s own 
free will and choice.
In this sense, intellect as a social regulator is “interaction” of reasonable people, 
who can not only understand each other, but can also make joint decisions aimed at 
“common good” or “public good”, and then “management” in the traditional sense 
of “submission” is replaced by “co-management” (just as the term “government” in 
political science is increasingly giving way to the term “governance”).
Thus, the intermediate conclusion is as follows: intellect – as a means of con-
trolling exposure – does not need power as a source of coercion.
Second, the intellect – as an attribute of a reasonable and free person – is able 
to construct a logical picture of the outside world and explain (at least to itself) the 
logic of events in the system of his or her own values, often opposed to, and even 
in direct conflict with “power” as a system of external coercion. If societal gover-
nance is implemented through “interaction between rational actors” (those who put 
forward ideas, articulate the problem, and agree on the order of problem resolution) 
and those who are rationally participating in such activity – in this situation, the 
power of coercion loses value. But if a free and educated person feels the influence 
of “irrational power” – in other words, the power which is uninformed, uneducated, 
incompetent, and, as a result, inefficient (we deliberately omitted all other possible 
defects of government), it inevitably awakens in this free and reasonable persona-
lity a sharp protest and a desire to “fix” the incompetent actions of “rulers” – in ac-
cordance with recommendations based on “expertise (expert’s knowledge)”.
This effect hinders dialogue between the authorities and the “intellectual class”, 
since both sides often demonstrate deafness, snobbery and lack of trust.
Another interim conclusion: due to their deep knowledge in their field, intel-
lectuals are most sensitive to managerial mistakes of the authorities and are more 
prepared to oppose them.
Finally, we clearly observe a number of failures in social policy and infrastruc-
ture caused by inadequate and really poor intellectual preparation of large-scale 
management solutions. Quite evident is not only the deep “gap” between two major 
types of elites – “intellectuals” and “authorities” – but also the sad consequences of 
a long series of incompetent government decisions that cause more collective social 
protest in modern Russian society. Therefore, the third – and the main – preliminary 
observation in today’s Russia is that this “compatibility” between the authorities 
and the intellectual community is losing every possible reason and is close to zero, 
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so that there is an urgent need to look for an appropriate mode of analyst/power in-
teraction.
Understanding Research Communities in Russian Regions
We decided to look into this issue from the grass-roots level – from the view of lo-
cal-based intellectuals, who are currently working with decision-making structures 
in Russian regions.
In order to establish a face-to-face connection with the widest possible range 
of local analysts, we identified, as the first step, the regions to be part of our “pilot 
project”, regions chosen as “contrasting examples” of regional political cultures 
and as very different political environments: Saratov Oblast, Republic of Karelia 
and Tatarstan.
Second, we used all available sources of information to identify people who are 
known to be part of the local analytical community, and we invited them to an initial 
meeting. For this purpose, we mobilized all research contacts in Moscow analyti-
cal structures we used to work with who know those regions, all our international 
partners who have ever worked with Russian regional researchers, the database of 
the Russian Association of Political Science and our regional partners, as well as the 
advice of friends and analysts from other regions.
Third, we created a special “community-building methodology”, involving lo-
cal researchers in the research of their own community, which was done by creat-
ing in selected regions “an open platform for dialogue”, trying to raise the interest 
in “analytical self-study” by representatives from all fields of research who con-
tributed to the decision-making in the sphere of public policy in their respective 
regions. We aimed to ensure that in our coverage of regions most of the existing 
analytical communities were represented, and for this purpose we used several par-
ticular methods, e.g. participation in the preparation of most of our regional round 
tables, specially prepared by our regional partners, analytical reports, speeches and 
replicas of our round tables, as well as a questionnaire distributed among those who 
could not attend personally. 
In addition to making an “inventory” of regional research communities them-
selves, it was important for us to highlight our research GOALS and make sure they 
are fully grasped:
– to understand and describe the political environment in which intellectual 
centers (think tanks) work in a particular region (such environment can be 
defined as “climate” of their activities);
– to specify the particular situation of every analytical center and every par-
ticipating analyst vis-à-vis the power-structures, where they are positioned 
in the so-called “vertical of power”, both federal and regional;
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– to identify the factors that allow them – and to what extent – to remain 
“independent” or “autonomous” from the power-structures in the pro-
cess, as well as the contents of their research and what this autonomy re-
ally means;
– to describe the kind of “analytical product” that they produce and its “ap-
plicability” at the regional and federal levels;
– to identify the channels through which these centers promote their intellec-
tual products to the public space and seek attention for their proposals.
Besides, we were seeking not only to collect the data on regional-level policy 
analysts, but also to contribute to the consolidation of the local research commu-
nity. We hope that the experience of our established sites and the discussions about 
the condition of the analytic community will lead to new meetings, that there will 
be new cause for an exchange of ideas, and that this experience will be an ongoing 
need and will lead to achieving our primary objective – the establishment of several 
networks of regional analytical communities.
Understanding the Public
Speaking of interaction with the audience, it is necessary to clarify what kind of 
audience we refer to. Unfortunately, the meaning of “public” and “audience” in 
Russian analytic discourse over the last 20 years has been quite different from their 
original meaning. For the most part, it developed within the framework of the mo-
dern Western analytic discourse.
It must be noted that, although the use of the words “public” and even “public 
policy” in modern texts has been steadily increasing lately, in most cases “public” 
still refers to an audience that needs to be entertained. In this context, the meaning 
of the Russian word for “public” is very different from what Aristotle meant and 
from the original or “classical” meaning, which is comprised in the word “repub-
lic”.
The public in the cities of ancient Greece, which we keep recalling, was pri-
marily a community that had several characteristics. Such a community, primarily 
related to general co-dependency of life on a common territory, was a people with 
shared responsibilities, which understood the common challenges involved in ad-
dressing these issues, a people with the quality of freedom of thought, will and 
action. And only then did the aggregate of all these qualities get the same “real 
audience” that wanted to have and was able to have an influence on the public ad-
ministration. We have gone far from this classical understanding of the public, and 
today this concept is used more as a theoretical construct, not only in Russia. The 
reason for this is the transformation of society itself – into the post-modern society, 
with its special culture “mediated” by the media.
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The emergence of a mass audience – “target audience” – of newspapers, radio, 
television, and finally the audience of the Internet, completely changed the under-
standing of the public. Now you do not necessarily know the person with whom you 
communicate “virtually” to share the general conditions of life or suffer the same 
problems, and most of all – to participate in solving them and to share responsibility 
for solving common problems. Every television show has its audience, but there is 
no interaction inside the audience, and hence there is no discussion of the problems, 
no making of personal and common positions, and above all – no shared responsi-
bility. A related problem is identification of the “public opinion”.
The public opinion always stumbles on the fact that “opinion”, as revealed by 
the polls, is not a generalization of the individual meaningful solution, but the re-
sult of manifestation of the individual will. There is now a “massivization” of sam-
ples of public behavior – basically, an imposition of replicable ways of thinking 
and behavior through the media and advertising. “Hundreds of thousands of peo-
ple have chosen this book/listened to this song/watched this film/gone to Seliger/
bought this vacuum cleaner” – we are swarmed by intrusive information followed 
by a downpour of slogans. And this is not limited to consumer goods; everything 
is reproduced without exception – from patterns of behavior at home and at work 
to stereotypes of social behavior, such as focusing on “personal success” despite of 
the “common good”.
The modern technology of “marketing networks” creates and distributes a cer-
tain pattern of behavior, taste, and opinions on a particular issue, the attitude to-
wards a political symbol or character. Then this sample spreads from one point of 
information on a wide network: it may be a newspaper, radio or Internet, and it is 
positioned as successful, “backed by all”, almost “universal”, so it is very difficult 
to keep from following this model, especially if it has to do with consumption of 
information. The definition of the modern notion of “public” in dictionaries is also 
linked to the consumption of information – in halls, stadiums, etc. Film and televi-
sion viewers, fans, audience of rock concerts – that is the public. There is a “mas-
sivization” – the spread of a single sample of thinking and behavior. And the public 
follows those samples.
We must admit all of this – the realities of our time, the inevitable product of 
mass culture, in which it is incredibly difficult to maintain individuality, not to fol-
low the mass, and preserve your own personal opinion. It is very difficult to articu-
late an original view, to clearly express it, and convey it to others in such a convin-
cing way that this opinion might “break” through the noise of mass phenomena.
In Russia, the “true public” is yet to be created. The “public/audience” that 
wants “bread and circuses” is confined to any kind of “informational abuse” and 
manipulation – it can easily be “converted” and driven to support authoritarian lead-
ers, aggressive ideologies or other myths created by skillful propaganda.
Belyaeva, N., Analysts: “Consultants” or “Independent Policy Actors”
137
Only in a few places in our regions – especially in small towns and villages – 
are there visible attempts of citizens at consolidation, which is a manifestation of a 
“real public” which is observable in meaningful collective organized and responsi-
ble behavior. A community-based awareness of their own collective identity is cre-
ated, and this results in the preservation and reproduction of this identity. If such 
“citizen coalitions” are built on common ethical norms or general political views, 
they are able to maintain and reproduce common citizen values, and on this basis, 
they are able to influence the broader community, thus creating a “responsible pub-
lic” – in the true meaning of the word.
Conditions and Strategies for an Independent Policy Analyst
Now we come to the role of analysts and intellectuals in dealing with the “public” 
that is their “living environment” – which, just as with “power”, they choose to deal 
with (or NOT to deal with).
We must above all remember that, in the contemporary world, the policy pro-
cess, as well as governance, is exercised on MANY LEVELS – from a small munici-
pality to the global level. And “power” on those different levels – represented by 
specific institutions and personalities – can be of very different QUALITY, which 
allows an analyst the CHOICE with which level to interact.
In a similar way, the “public” that forms the “social environment” for an in-
dividual analyst or an analytical institution is also of very different QUALITY – in 
terms of the level of education and wealth, as well as in terms of values, interests 
and ethics – and it is very diverse and fragmented. This also necessitates a CHOICE 
– which public an analyst wants to be related to and associated with, and which 
“public interest” is worth being explored, presented and supported.
The majority of the population in every country is heavily influenced by mass 
media and intense advertising of all sorts, which are very hard to resist, and it is un-
able to create an individual, personally-developed opinion based on an understand-
ing of events and on personal experience. This very special social quality – “stable 
self-reliance”, the independence and consistency of one’s own personal position – is 
a privilege of well-educated people, because it is their education and trained mind 
that help them build “filters” for information and propaganda flows; they retain the 
freedom to build their own intellectual worldview.
Thus, the intellectuals, capable of critical thinking and analysis, are a very im-
portant source of independent public opinion.
We are currently witnessing a decline in the meaning of “public opinion” in the 
original sense, which was used by Jürgen Habermas – the collective opinion of the 
INDIVIDUAL members of the public that is based on the ability of citizens for criti-
cal analysis of information and formed on the basis of individual experiences.
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The intellectuals could become a “growth point” of independent public opini-
on, which we are desperately in need of.
Some recent examples from Russia of total dependence of public opinion on 
propaganda are appalling. In the early 1990s, when the country was run by “west-
ernizers” and, according to public polls, political friendship with the USA was very 
popular, an average citizen perceived the USA not only as a “friendly” country, but 
also as a “role model”. After only 7-8 years, with a new political leadership and 
with a change of vector of the political propaganda to a new anti-western rhetoric, 
the majority of our citizens have come to regard the USA as “dangerous”, even as 
an “enemy”.
By sharing their knowledge and critical views with the citizens, the intellec-
tuals and analysts can become an instrument of enlarging the critically thinking 
public, BUT this requires certain qualities from the analysts themselves: to behave 
as public policy actors, which means – to recognize and respect OTHER actors, be 
aware of the others’ interests, be prepared to listen and hear other opinions, be ready 
to compete, to defend one’s position, as well as to compromise and find some com-
mon ground – for the common purpose.
Unfortunately, we found in our research of regional analytical communities in 
Russia that analysts, who clearly positioned themselves as “consultants to power”, 
failed to demonstrate those qualities. Instead they preferred to stick to their own 
opinion, which is the “only right opinion”, and attended the regional meetings not 
to listen, but to “preach the truth”, which – in some cases – made obvious a deep 
GAP between regional intellectuals: those working “for the authorities” and those 
working on alternatives to the currently adopted policy options.
Among the analysts currently working for the acting authorities, there were 
many professional and responsible people, but they did not feel like engaging in a 
dialogue with other analysts of the alternative position. The same was observed on 
the other side: those actively seeking alternatives to the currently adopted policy op-
tions saw no benefit in engaging in a dialogue with their colleagues in an intellectu-
al workshop, because they belonged to the “other side”. This was seen most vividly 
in Kazan, Tatarstan, where the political climate fosters such attitude, and least of all 
in Karelia, where the institutional environment for the analytical work is profoundly 
different – both in the power-design and the public political culture.
So what does it take for analysts – or an analytical center – to be an “indepen-
dent actor”?
The results of our research – both on federal and regional levels – allowed us 
to specify several categories of those who are viewed as “independent from power”, 
but still influential enough to be regarded as “autonomous policy actors”.
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First category: big and resourceful research and consulting institutions with 
history and reputation, and with highly diversified sources of income.
Second category: NGO-based analytical teams with strong public recognition 
and trust in their decency, and a firm position among the citizens.
Third category: issue-based, highly focused professional researchers, writing 
policy papers on request, often funded from outside the region or from abroad.
Those categories can be translated to successful “independence-building stra-
tegies”, which are focused on working with different power-levels or governance-
-levels, as well as working with different public. There is one important feature they 
have in common: respect for the public interest and the “public good” concept, en-
gaging in dialogue and producing alternatives for collective solutions to common 
problems.
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